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VOLUME 64 WINTER 1999 NUMBER 1
The Rise of Duty and the Fall of In Loco
Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doctrines
in Higher Education Law
Peter F. Lake*
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of twentieth century higher education student safety law' is the
gradual application of typical rules of civil liability to institutions of higher
education and the decline of insulating doctrines, such as in loco parentis,
2
which traditionally protected institutions of higher learning from scrutiny in the
legal system. A series of recent events have brought public (and legal) attention
to questions about the legal rules governing university responsibility for student
injuries.3 In recent times, courts have reversed a long-standing tradition of
protecting universities from civil liability for physical injury to students arising
* ©Peter F. Lake (1999), A.B., J.D., Harvard University; Professor, Stetson
University College of Law. The Author expresses gratitude to Professor Robert D.
Bickel, who offered valuable insights on this Article. Professor Bickel and the Author
are co-authors of THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY: WHO
ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIFE? (forthcoming Spring 1999, Carolina Academic
Press).
1. Higher education includes colleges, community colleges and universities,
undergraduate and graduate programs. Except where particularly relevant, I use "college,
university" and "higher education" more or less interchangeably.
2. "[I]nstead of a parent; charged factitiously with a parent's rights, duties and
responsibilities." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See Leo Reisberg, Some Experts Say Colleges Share the Responsibility for the
Recent Riots, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 15, 1998, at A48. Recent
campus riots over beer privileges, a string of alcohol related deaths at prestigious colleges
including MIT and LSU and student injuries in study abroad programs and externships
have been discussed in the media.
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in the course of education. It is a time of transformation and transition in higher
education and higher education student safety law.
In the last few decades, courts have applied (and focused upon) the
tort/negligence law of "duty" to university affairs affecting student safety. The
ascension of duty (and the fall of insulating doctrines) is an unmistakable
transformation in higher education law. The rise in application of duty rules has
brought an increase in legal liability and also an increase in judicial scrutiny of
college affairs. Still, in many cases, courts use duty analysis to determine that
there is no university liability. The messages of the new era of university
law-the duty era-are cautious and mixed; with duty has come responsibility
and legal accountability, but not always legal liability.
4
Understandably, the shift to duty analysis has caused substantial confusion
and concern in the higher education community. The most common concern
(facilitated by several court decisions of the 1970s and 1980s) is that the law of
higher education is "returning" to some bygone era in some way or other and/or
that institutions of higher education are shouldering extreme or unusual burdens.5
In actuality, what is and has been occurring is both entirely new and familiar.
The widespread application of duty rules and principles to colleges is new: yet,
those rules and principles are similar to ones which courts typically use with
regard to other similar operations, especially businesses. The rise of duty is the
special application of business law and other standard duty rules to university
operations. It has been a time of mainstreaming for higher education law. The
duty era is a period that features paradigms of shared responsibility for risk and
injury to students.
II. THE FOUR PHASES OF MODERN UNIVERSITY LAW AND THE
TREND TOWARDS MAINSTREAMING
To appreciate how higher education safety law arrived at its current state,
it is useful to recognize four evolutionary/historical phases in the growth of
university law. The first phase-roughly from the beginning of the Republic to
the early 1960s was the epoch of legal insularity. In that period, universities
were protected from legal actions of almost all varieties involving student safety
and discipline. Courts protected university affairs by way of a trinity of tort
immunities and related tort doctrines. There was little case law until the 1960s:
so little in fact that there are more reported higher education safety law cases in
4. Courts today assiduously avoid imposing strict liability on colleges and instead
favor approaches which apportion responsibility among students and institutions. See
infra Section VI.A.
5. See, e.g., Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An
Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1135 (1991); James J.
Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges'Increasing Exposure to Liability: The New In
Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 453 (1987).
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the last five or so years than there were in the nearly two centuries preceding.
In the next phase-the civil rights phase-higher education lost immunities
regarding certain rights over student discipline and regulation. In this phase
(roughly the 1960s and early 1970s) university insularity was breached by a
series of cases holding that public universities must provide basic constitutional
rights to students. The fall of some legal insularity harbinged even more
dramatic legal inroads into university affairs. The third phase (roughly the mid-
1970s to mid-1980s) saw an almost complete redefinition of legal regulation of
college safety rules. This phase was defined by certain signature cases that put
the modem college in the role of a bystander or a business. This phase saw the
rise of duty law and saw universities shoulder new responsibilities in certain
business categories, but also saw them deflect responsibility ("no-duty") as
bystanders to some student misconduct, particularly dangers associated with
alcohol use and abuse. This phase has been particularly troublesome for courts
and commentators to sort out, partly because courts in that period did little to
attempt to reconcile apparently disparate (some duty, some no-duty) opinions.
The current and fourth phase-the duty phase-is truly an extension of the
previous phase. Courts today continue to consolidate university law around duty
paradigms and have begun to challenge some no-duty rules of the previous
bystander/business period.
Under current prevailing doctrines, the closest analogy to university legal
responsibility for student safety remains business responsibility for
customer/consumer/tenant safety. Increasingly, courts treat universities-public
and private-like other businesses. Yet, throughout the history of the law of
higher education, universities have received unique and special treatment. In the
current duty era, this special treatment now reflects in the special application of
general rules of tort duty to institutions of higher learning. In essence,
universities are business-like, but are not businesses like shopping malls or
restaurants. To courts, universities collectively are sui generis: and each college
or university environment must be evaluated individually for its own special
circumstances as well. Thus, the current duty era is both a time of
mainstreaming and of tailoring.
III. ERA OF INSULARITY: UNIVERSITY PROTECTION BY
IMMUNITIES AND OTHER COMMON LAW DOCTRINES PRE-1960
With few exceptions, the typical college or university was insularized from
legal scrutiny regarding student safety and student rights until the early to mid
1960s (more or less). First, the typical university was considered to be similar
to institutions like the family, charities, and the government, which had all been
afforded substantial protective tort immunities.6 In addition, colleges enjoyed
6. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 901-
07, 1032-71 (5th ed. 1984).
1999]
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the protection of defensive tort doctrines that were shared by society at large.
For example, to the extent that the use of alcohol by students created risks of
physical danger, a college typically enjoyed-like many other defendants of that
era-broad protection from tort liability for alcohol related injuries. Another
example: by common rules of proximate causation of that era a deliberate
attacker would have been the sole proximate cause of a student victim's injuries,
even where a college had been negligent in maintaining security on campus.
And, prior to the advent of comparative fault, all-or-nothing affirmative defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk would have barred many
student injury claims, just as they would have barred the claims of many other
plaintiffs in other settings.7
There was never a "university" tort immunity as such: courts wove
analogous immunities given to other institutions and other doctrines together to
make a defacto university immunity that was similar to, but not the same as,
protections given to other major societal institutions. Where appropriate, the
university was immunized as a parent (in loco parentis), a charity, or a
government; or protected like a "social host" would be regarding alcohol use, or
shielded by rules of proximate causation or by all-or-nothing affirmative
defenses. The net result was minimal legal/judicial intrusion in college affairs
regarding student rights and safety.
A. Family Immunity-In Loco Parentis
Until relatively recently, the college/student relationship was considered to
be as much, if not more of, a collegelparent affair than a direct collegelstudent
relationship. In other words, a parent sent a "child" off to college-entering into
an agreement with the institution-and delegated certain supervisory and
disciplinary powers in the process. With regard to certain types of
activities-those principally involving deliberate institutional acts of student
regulation and discipline-the college stood "in loco parentis."8 The power of
in locoparentis lay in the immunity that a college received from courts regarding
lawsuits by students who were disgruntled over regulation and discipline.9
7. Id. at461,480-81.
8. See Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924); Illinois ex rel. Pratt v.
Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866); Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1913).
9. Brian Jackson put it this way:
The use of in loco parentis amounted to blanket judicial approval for all
disciplinary actions against students. Some opinions invoking in locoparentis
referred to contract law and contained premonitions of more balanced
alternatives. Most courts, however, remained hostile to the student litigant.
Any rule or regulation, however broad, was enforced. More important, the
courts were unwilling to question a university's determination that the student
was guilty of violating the rule at issue. Students enjoyed virtually no
[Vol. 64
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Very few students, parents, or others tested the college regulatory
disciplinary power during the pre-1960s heyday of in loco parentis. While
courts hinted at possible judicial intervention in some disciplinary matters, 10
colleges typically won cases even when rules were vague, imprecise, and
salutary, and when enforcement of rules was so procedurally casual that it
bordered upon arbitrariness and capriciousness. Expelling a student summarily
for "offensive habits," for example, was permissible." Not surprisingly, given
that sort of latitude, a college could prevent students from associating in certain
ways or frequenting certain establishments," or regulate virtually any form of
expression or conduct on or off campus, 13 and of course, grade, evaluate, expel,
etc. almost at will.'
4
The root of the power to be in loco parentis lay in contract and/or in
delegation of sovereign power from the state via charter. 5 Whether by explicit
agreement, tacit agreement, and/or by delegated sovereign authority, the
university-public or private-acquired parental rights and powers.'6 In this era,
a parent was virtually immune from lawsuit by a child: the parent had broad
rights to discipline, etc., and a child had little or no right to protection from a
parent's intentional or negligent torts, particularly those involving intangible
interests like speech, association, and economic opportunity. 7 The college
stepped-at least in part-into this parental immunity. When a college
deliberately regulated or disciplined a student-allegedly denying that student
intangible, civil, or economic rights-the courts used in loco parentis to
immunize the college.
Today, there is quite a bit of discussion in the literature of a perceived
return to or "lingering" of in loco parentis.'8 The concerns relate to certain
protection from either vague or intrusive rules or inadequate procedural
safeguards.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 1147-48 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
10. See, e.g., Gott, 161 S.W. at 206 (stating that a court will only interfere with
college regulations that are "unlawful or against public policy"); see also Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435 (App. Div. 1928) (using rules of contract interpretation
favorable to a university in upholding regulatory/dismissal power).
11. Hunt, 102 So. at 640-41.
12. Gott, 161 S.W. at 205-07 (upholding rule forbidding students from entering
"eating houses or places of amusement" not controlled by the college).
13. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640-41 (Fla. 1924).
14. In one case, a student at Syracuse University was successfully expelled for not
being "a typical Syracuse girl." Anthony, 231 N.Y.S. at 437.
15. See Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913); Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435 (App. Div. 1928).
16. See Gott, 161 S.W. at 206; Anthony, 224 N.Y.S. at 435.
17. See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
18. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 1151-60; Brian Snow & William Thro, Redefining
the Contours of University Liability: The Potential Implications ofNero v. Kansas State
University, 90 ED. LAw. REP. 989,991-93 (1994); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 5, at
1999]
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modem cases'9 that impose responsibilities on colleges to "protect" students
from danger and appear to be a manifestation of a protective parental role for
colleges toward students. These concerns, however, are historically misguided
and doctrinally incoherent. As Theodore Stamatakos has pointed out, no
historical case ever openly used in loco parentis to protect student safety by
determining that colleges had legal responsibilities (or duties) to students to
protect them. 20 The in loco parentis doctrine was used entirely as a way to
defend a college's exercise of authority, not to require a college to exercise
disciplinary or regulatory power. In loco parentis was a shield for colleges, not
a sword for students. It was a power, not a duty. At common law, parents were
not legally required to care for their children's safety interests.21 The notion that
placing someone in locoparentis would create a duty to care for a child (student)
is a latter day development in K-12 education law. During the heyday of in loco
parentis, a parent had no legal responsibility to discipline or "regulate" a child;
the parent had a right to do so. It is tempting to think in terms of correlative
rights and duties, particularly because most American colleges and universities
did exercise substantial dominion, control, and protection over students and
student lives. However, in locoparentis was an immunity, woven with others,
that a college could assert against certain kinds of student claims. To return to
or to reconfigure in locoparentis would be to recreate an era of legal immunity,
not legal duty.
B. University as Immune Charity or Governmental Entity
In the period before the 1960s, the case law sometimes confronted a
different type of problem than that presented by the typical in locoparentis case.
In those other cases, courts were asked by students to impose duties of care upon
colleges to protect students' physical safety in dormitories, classrooms, and
walkways, with regard to other students or persons, and on field trips, etc. The
issues in these cases were about physical safety of students-not discipline or
expulsion-and typically raised questions of university negligence (acts or
omissions or both), not deliberate or intentional acts of disciplinary or regulatory
power.
With little exception, universities were also once broadly immunized from
liability in these lawsuits. A tort parental immunity would have functioned very
well to protect colleges from negligence based tort lawsuits based upon alleged
457-64.
19. See, e.g., Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 779 (Kan. 1993) (holding
that college, as landlord, has duty to protect female student tenants from known
dangerous assailant).
20. Theodore Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability
and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 482-83 (1990).
21. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887.
[Vol. 64
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failures to protect students, maintain premises, etc. Again, at common law
parents were virtually entirely immune from such lawsuits. Courts, however,
chose another path to insularize university activities from lawsuits. If a college
were aprivate institution, courts often invoked charitable immunities as a way
to block tort lawsuits.22 If a college were a public institution, courts would
invoke governmental immunities (and sometimes also charitable immunities, if
appropriate) to protect that college from tort lawsuits.23 Students sought to
impose ordinary tort duties upon higher educational institutions, 24 but courts
analogized universities to charities and governments for these purposes. Where
there were traditional exceptions to either immunity, 25 and to the extent these
immunities began to erode before 1960, students might have found a crack in the
armor of university insularity,26 but the cracks were not wide.
C. Protections Afforded by Rules of Proximate Causation, Liquor
Liability Rules, and Affirmative Defenses
Well into the twentieth century, American courts would often hold that a
deliberate, willful, and/or criminal act was so "unforeseeable" and "unexpected
and extraordinary" as to be a superceding, intervening, or supervening cause of
a harm: the negligence of another actor was thus not the legal or proximate
cause of injury.27 While the rule was not without exception and began to erode
22. For example, in Hamburger v. Cornell, 148 N.E. 539, 546 (N.Y. 1925), a
student was injured in a laboratory incident and despite a jury award for the
plaintiff/student, the court determined that the university was an immune charitable
entity. Id. at 335. See also Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 75 N.E. 991 (Ill. 1905) (barring
suit alleging negligence of university professor under charitable immunity); Alstonz v.
Walden Academy, 102 S.W. 351 (Tenn. 1907) (barring liability for neglect to provide
fire escapes under charitable immunity).
23. See Davie v. Board of Regents, 227 P. 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (holding
student injured by university infimnary physician cannot sue the university because of
governmental immunity); Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 199 N.W. 618 (Mich.
1924) (applying both charitable and governmental immunities).
24. Neither the immunity, nor the source of any duty alleged was rooted in in loco
parentis. Students did not assert any sort of "parental responsibility" duties. To do so
would have been incoherent under prevailing doctrines.
25. See Barr v. Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc'y, 190 N.Y.S. 296, 297 (Sup. Ct.
1921) (suggesting in dicta that a college could be liable under some circumstances
because New York traditionally provided less charitable immunity).
26. For a rare case in which a student injured in a laboratory explosion successfully
sued the university for negligence, see Brigham Young Univ. v. Lilly White, 118 F.2d
836 (10th Cir. 1941).
27. See, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1910) (holding man who deliberately threw a match into a negligently caused
gasoline spill was the proximate cause of harm); see also DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS &
COMPENSATION 237 n.1 (2d ed. 1993) (citing H.L.A. HART&A.M. HONOSE, CAUSATION
1999]
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in the middle part of the twentieth century,21 it was nonetheless a powerful
deterrent to certain potential claims of university responsibility. For example,
a college student attacked and robbed would have had little recourse even if the
college negligently facilitated the crime by, say, failing to keep a parking area
well lit. The attacker would have been the sole proximate cause of injury claims
against a college arising from sexual assaults, and what we know today as date-
rape would have been likewise barred from legal redress.
This rule also had a special analog in liquor-related injury cases. As the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma pointed out:
At common law a tavern owner ... is not civilly liable for a third
person's injuries that are caused by the acts of an intoxicated patron.
Such rule is principally based upon concepts of causation that, as a
matter of law, it is not the sale of liquor by the tavern owner, but the
voluntary consumption by the intoxicated person, which is the
proximate cause of resulting injuries, so that the tavern owner is
therefore not liable for negligence in selling the liquor.29
Typically, the person furnishing alcohol was not considered to be a
proximate cause of injury; the drinker was the proximate cause. Such a rule
made it impossible to sue a university for failure to prevent alcohol use and/or
for failing to enforce alcohol codes, etc., for example. It is not surprising then
that there were no liquor liability cases by students against institutions of higher
education until later in the twentieth century.
The no liability for liquor proximate cause rule gave way mid-century to
new rights of action based upon Dram Shops Acts and/or similar rules
announced in case law.30 Either by Dram Shop Act, rule of court, or both, the
traditional rule of proximate causation was abolished.3' However, legislatures
and courts recognized the potential for almost unlimited liquor liability and
severely limited liability for serving or furnishing alcohol. For the most part,
states placed duties of care upon commercial vendors of liquor regarding on
premises consumption of alcohol, and then only if that vendor sold liquor to a
visibly and noticeably intoxicated patron or to a minor.32 These rules were
supplemented by statutes prohibiting the furnishing of liquor to minors and by
rules of negligent entrustment that made it unreasonable to provide certain
IN THE LAW (1962)).
28. See Concord Florida, Inc. v. Lewin, 341 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding arsonist is not sole proximate cause of fire); Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va.
1921) (holding negligence of railroad not barred by criminal attacks on plaintiff).
29. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1986).
30. Id. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d I (N.J. 1959).
31. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302-03.
32. Id. at 303.
[Vol. 64
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chattels to intoxicated persons.33 For the most part, all other parties connected
to alcohol use and injury (other than the drinker) were not liable.
The new rules were highly protective of colleges. Colleges were seen to be,
at most, social hosts or entities that merely engendered, tolerated, or facilitated
alcohol use. As such, colleges did not face significant risk of liability for alcohol
related injury to students. In the 1970s, some questions arose in the courts
regarding 'social host' liability-potentially impacting the typical college-but
as discussed infra, colleges were largely able to avoid liability for liquor related
injuries in this period as well.
Finally, as if the powerful combination of immunities and rules of
proximate causation/liquor liability were not enough, most states under most
circumstances before 1960 would bar a plaintiff's action entirely if that plaintiff
were either contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of injury.34 Thus,
only blameless or ignorant-of-risk students had any chance to overcome these
affirmative defense based bars to recovery. It was thus unlikely that a
plaintiff/student could have any chance of recovery: immunities would have to
fail in a case with no student misconduct (or assumed risk) and with no
deliberate action (or drinking) of another.
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE DECLINE
OF INSULARITY
The 1961 decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama35 marked the
beginning of the end for in locoparentis as an immunity insularizing the public
(and later, indirectly, the private) college. Dixon involved questions regarding
a university's power to expel, discipline, and regulate students. In that case,
several black students in Alabama were perfunctorily expelled from a public
college in vague terms, but most certainly for their participation in civil rights
demonstrations. The Fifth Circuit determined that a college's power (including
in locoparentis) did not extend to the denial of basic constitutional rights of fair
36play and process, including procedural due process. Students at public
universities became constitutional adults with basic constitutional rights.
After Dixon, courts determined that students at public colleges enjoyed a
range of constitutional freedoms including freedom of speech and association
and rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.37 As later courts and
33. Id. at 304.
34. As Dan Dobbs has pointed out: "Before 1960, only a handful of states had
adopted comparative negligence for tort cases generally. From the late 1960s through
the 1980s a wave of change washed through the states. In some states legislatures
adopted comparative fault; in others, the courts did so." DOBBS, supra note 27, at 258.
35. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
36. Id. at 158-59.
37. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
1999]
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commentators would come to recognize, in loco parentis, as an immunity in
lawsuits challenging rights to discipline and regulate, was dead.38
Technically, Dixon et al. related only topublic colleges. As Brian Jackson
has pointed out:
Dixon v. Alabama often is hailed as a pivotal rejection of the in loco
parentis doctrine. But despite the Dixon decision, thousands of
students at private universities remain outside the scope of
constitutional protection. Since the Dartmouth College case
recognized the independent nature of private education in the United
States, the courts have been nearly unanimous in holding that private
colleges and universities are not instruments of the state. As a result,
actions by these schools cannot be attributed to the state for
constitutional purposes. The Dixon decision thus left untouched
thousands of students attending private colleges and universities.
These students have no substantive or procedural constitutional
safeguards. "
By virtue of state action doctrines, Dixon's rejection of in locoparentis would
have to come to campuses in other ways.
Following the spirit of the decisions regarding public universities, courts
began to decide that private colleges also owed their students fundamental
fairness." The courts achieved this through rules of contract interpretation and
read "the contract" liberally in favor of student rights and narrowly in terms of
purported "waivers" of contract rights.41 The result was that in the wake of
Dixon; in loco parentis ultimately fell as an immunity for private colleges as
well.
(1972); Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1988); Gay Student Servs. v.
Texas A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Liberation v. University of Mo.,
558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Greenhill v. Bailey,
519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974);
University of S. Miss. Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of S.
Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971); Plazzalo v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971)
(private university); Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970); Bishop v.
Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948
(M.D. Ala. 1985); Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982);
Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976); Soglin v. Kauffhian, 295 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Woody v. Bums, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
38. See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418-19 (Utah 1986);
Stamatakos, supra note 20, at 474-75.
39. Jackson, supra note 5, at 1153-54 (citations omitted).
40. See Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); see also Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984).
41. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
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It is important, however, not to read too much into the fall of in loco
parentis as a result of the civil rights cases. As Theodore Stamatakos has
correctly observed, "[These] decisions concerned college disciplinary
actions-including rules of conduct and student searches-not institutional tort
liability."4 Only one type of insulation against certain types of claims had
eroded. Erosion of the remaining aspects of insularity was to occur in other
ways.
V. THE BYSTANDER/BUSINESS ERA: THE RISE OF DUTY AND THE
ALMOST COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF TRADITIONAL INSULATING
TORT DOCTRINES
In the 1970s and early 1980s, several trends emerged in higher education
law. First, in most states, comparative fault had replaced the all-or-nothing
defenses of contributory fault and, to some extent, assumed risk;43 faulty
plaintiffs now found greater access to tort remedies. Second, rules of proximate
causation began to relax and some defendants were now required to guard
against the foreseeable misconduct of third parties (including plaintiffs) and in
some instances, criminal misconduct.' Third, trends toward the erosion of
traditional charitable and governmental immunities which began somewhat
earlier were now in full swing: charities were now rarely immune from tort
lawsuits45 and governments, while still protected, were scrutinized particularly
when they engaged in proprietary and/or ministerial (non-discretionary) actions
or assumed duties to particular members or segments of the public. 46 All of these
changes were not indigenous to university law per se, but were part of larger
global changes in American tort law that also came to roost locally in the law of
higher education. These changes were not, however, complemented with
significant changes in attitudes towards "social host" drinking-although the
issue was tested. Thus, this period saw the rise in duty case law and also of
some no-liability/no-duty rules in cases involving student alcohol related
injuries.
With the fall of traditional immunities and the demise of strict affirmative
defenses and rules of proximate causation, the law of duty was given the
opportunity to rise to the forefront of university law. In a series of key university
42. Stamatakos, supra note 20, at 474.
43. See DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 251-54,257 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477,
481 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (establishing that landlord only has to protect tenants from criminal
attacks and that the criminal attacker is not the superseding cause of injury).
45. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo.
1969); Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ohio
1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1965).
46. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 43, at 261-66.
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law cases, the courts established that universities had actionable duties to
students in certain important overlapping areas-premises maintenance,
curricular and co-curricular safety, dormitory/residential life safety, and
dangerous persons. Courts began to treat colleges more and more like
businesses. However, when alcohol found a way into the mix, courts of this
period frequently stated no-duty rules. The new no-duty rules stated that
colleges had become legal bystanders to "uncontrollable" student alcohol use.
These cases went so far as to hold that there was nothing "special" in the
college/student relationships. On their face, the duty and no-duty cases seemed
irreconcilable; however, these cases reflected a common theme in that they
represented further evolution toward the duty paradigm. Even in exonerating
colleges in cases involving student alcohol (mis)use, courts focused upon lack
of duty, not the traditional insulating doctrines.
A. Duty--Premises Maintenance
In this period, courts did not hesitate to say that a university was legally
responsible to perform routine maintenance on premises or face tort litigation.
Colleges were "landowners" and owed appropriate duties to certain "entrants"
(usually students, their guests, and university personnel and their guests) who
were considered "invitees" to whom reasonable care was owed.47 Colleges were
often analogized to businesses and many entrants on premises were treated like
business customers.48 Colleges thus became responsible for providing
reasonably safe walkways, proper lighting, and other aspects of reasonably safe
premises.
B. Curricular/Co-Curricular Student Safety
The fall of traditional immunities and other tort doctrines opened the way
for students to sue colleges regarding injuries sustained in curricular and co-
curricular activities. The first notable case regarding curricular activities
occurred during the insularity era when a few courts were rethinking traditional
immunities. In 1941, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a university could be sued
when a student was injured in a laboratory class by an explosion caused by
university negligence.49 That case established that a university owed a duty of
reasonable care regarding physical safety in the conduct of classes, laboratories,
etc."°
47. See Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1979); Isaacson v.
Husson College, 332 A.2d 757, 760 (Me. 1975); Shannon v. Washington Univ., 575
S.W.2d 235, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
48. See DIAMOND ETAL., supra note 43, at 261-66.
49. Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836, 843 (10th Cir. 1941).
50. The courts do not accept educational malpractice arguments, but that is another
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In the bystander era, universities became potentially responsible for injuries
incurred in off-campus, co-curricular or extracurricular activities. The leading
case is Mintz v. New York.51 The case involved the outer limits of university
responsibility for off-campus, extracurricular student activities. In that case,
students were drowned in an icy lake during an overnight canoe trip. 2 The
intercollegiate outing club had a university chapter, although beyond that, the
university itself did little with regard to the activities of the particular trip in
question. Nonetheless, the university became a defendant in the litigation.
Much to the surprise of the university legal community at the time, Mintz
determined that the university had a duty of reasonable care to the students. 4
The far reaching implications of Mintz's duty rule were buffered by the fact that
the court determined that, in that case, the university did not breach the duty and
was not a legal cause of the students' drowning." The canoes were tipped by a
sudden and unforeseeable wind on the lake: the activity club was well
supervised and adequately guided and prepared for foreseeable dangers.5 6
The university escaped liability in Mintz, but a duty rule was born. The
case had tremendous implications. Given that the role of the university in the
particular incident was minimal-just one step from a student organized canoe
run down a rough and cold Class III river during spring break-Mintz's duty rule
clearly encompassed the full range of extracurricular activities in which
universities exercised more supervision, direction, structure, and control. Mintz
signaled a radical shift from the era of the insularized university. Loss of
insularity did not necessarily mean liability, but courts would now be willing to
scrutinize university affairs.
C. Residential/Dormitory Safety
In the bystander period, the courts began to recognize that students living
on campus in dormitories or other university operated residential housing were
similar to the tenants of landlords who owned apartments or similar housing.
Courts rapidly determined that students were entitled to reasonably safe campus
housing.57 The university thus became like other landlords and was responsible
for reasonable maintenance and security on premises and for using reasonable
care to protect students from foreseeable dangers, including intrusion by
matter. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 345-46.
51. 362 N.Y.S. 2d 619 (App. Div. 1975).
52. Id. at 620.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 621.
56. Id. at 620-21
57. See Duarte v. California, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804, 812 (Ct. App. 1978); Mullins v.
Pine Manor College, 449 N.E. 2d 331, 335-36 (Mass. 1983).
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dangerous persons. These responsibilities significantly overlapped with the
college's duty to provide safe premises generally.
D. Dangerous Persons
At one time, a rapist or murderer, etc. was considered the sole proximate
cause of injury, but judicial attitudes about such dangerous persons shifted in the
1970s and mid-1980s. Two seminal university law cases of this period stand
out-Mullins v. Pine Manor College58 and Tarasoff v. Board of Regents. 9
The Mullins case involved a horrible sexual assault and abduction of a
college dormitory resident. The court determined that colleges have duties to use
reasonable care to protect against foreseeable criminal intrusion and attacks.6'
Colleges would now have to use care to guard against dangerous persons in the
greater community who might come to prey upon students on campus. The
Mullins rule would later be extended to include protection against dangerous
students on campus.6'
The university also now had duties regarding persons on campus
endangering off-campus non-students in similar circumstances as well. In an
unprecedented extension of duty-based responsibility, the California Supreme
Court in Tarasoff determined that university psychotherapists had a duty to use
reasonable care to warn/protect a foreseeably endangered non-student off-
campus victim from a patient who had expressed credible violent and dangerous
intentions towards that person.62 In one form or another, Tarasoff's duty to
warn/protect rule has become the majority rule in America 3 As a result of
Tarasoff, a college must protect students from dangerous persons under a
number of circumstances.
E. The No-Duty Student Alcohol Cases-Bystander Rules
Against the backstage of the application of business-like duty rules to
college campuses, some courts of this period also stated rules forming a new
type of legal protection for colleges. These cases all involved students who were
injured in incidents involving alcohol use. The cases turned to tort rescue
doctrines-hence the bystander moniker-and became highly celebrated case
law in the university community.
58. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
59. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
60. Id. at 335-36.
61. See, e.g., Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 780 (Kan. 1983).
62. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345.
63. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994); see also
Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
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The cases arose at a time in American law when courts were being asked
to reject social host immunities and to broaden the categories of tort
responsibility for injury arising from alcohol use and abuse:6 the courts
generally rejected the expansion of responsibility (although there were notable
exceptions). 5 Typically, American courts have protected employers when
employees drink on the job or at office parties, 66 and they have also protected
those employers who have facilitated drunken persons to return to their own cars
and drive away.67 The position of the courts of this era was so strong that it was
clear that there was no duty (other than for bars and bartenders) to prevent a
drunk person from creating danger to herself and others even if there was a
"special" relationship between the person and the drinker.68 The margin of
responsibility was determined by the extent, if any, that a defendant facilitated
a drunk person's own danger and endangering of others, but courts of this period
usually took a pro-defendant view and required either negligent entrustment of
a dangerous item (like giving a drunk a car) or "control" over the drunk (as in a
bar, or in an involuntary detoxification center or jail).69 In short, American law
of this period was generally unprepared to impose civil liquor liability on social
or other (non-bar/bartender) hosts for furnishing alcohol to adults, nor was it
willing to require people, even in legally special relationships with drunks, to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of drinkers and others except under
unusual circumstances or in the exceptional case.
Thus, when students (or others) were injured in alcohol related incidents,
the courts of this era instinctively followed the pattern of other non-college
drinking cases. The college alcohol cases seemed out of line with other cases of
the period imposing business duties, but they were not. The non-alcohol cases
raised issues of residential life and premises safety, safety in student activities,
64. As Diamond et al. relate:
Starting in the late 1970's, courts began to reconsider this common law view
[that the drinker was the sole proximate cause of harm]. Several
[jurisdictions] imposed liability on commercial suppliers of liquor. A few
went further and determined that a social host could be liable to a third party
injured by a drunken guest .... Most courts [and jurisdictions,] however,
have refused to impose liability on social hosts.... These cases are viewed
as duty to control cases because the plaintiff is asserting that the defendant
should have stepped in to prevent the drunken third party from driving.
DIAMOND ETAL., supra note 47, at 124-25 (footnotes omitted).
65. See, e.g., Leppke v. Segura, 632 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)
(imposing duty on person who jump started drunk's car); Kelly v. Gwinell, 476 A.2d
1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984) (imposing limited social host liability).
66. See Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983).
67. See DeBolt v. Dragen Auto Supply, Inc., 227 Cal. Rptr. 258 (Ct. App. 1986);
cf. Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983) (imposing liability if
employee is served liquor and is a minor).
68. DIAMOND ETAL., supra note 43, at 125.
69. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 43, at 125.
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and problems with dangerous persons. The alcohol cases talked of rescue law
and no-duty to bystander rules, and spoke in terms of duty and, in some
instances, special relationships. Neither line of authority was especially
conscious of the other, but that was not too surprising given that courts were
treating colleges much like businesses across the board. Importantly, a powerful
defacto alcohol injury immunity (stated in the form of "no-duty") had come into
existence, and it was powerful enough to trump background business-like duties
ifalcohol or student drinkeis were prominent in causing or contributing to the
injury.
In a series of famous bystander era cases, courts held that there was no duty
to protect a studeni-drinker from injury related to inebriation while on a required
curricular trip in a remote location,7" that there wasno duty to protect a female
student in her dormitory from an individual drinking and performing a dangerous
fraternity-encouraged "ritual,"'" that there was no duty to protect students who
drank in a dormitory and then went off campus to engage in drag racing,72 and
that there was no duty to protect even underage students from injury incurred
after leaving a school sponsored off-campus drinking party.73
These cases have become known as the "bystander" cases because in each
of them the university was cast in the role of a legal bystander to
"uncontrollable" student actions and drinking.74 These courts saw the problems
presented in terms of nonfeasance/no-duty to rescue law and refused to view the
student/university relationship as sufficiently "special" to impose any duty of
care upon the college.75 As such, the typical college was a mere bystander.
The cases seemed anomalous and inconsistent in that other courts had
established that students were in a special relationship regarding on-premises
safety as either "business invitees" or "tenants,"76 that colleges were responsible
for safety in on and off-campus co-curricular and extracurricular events, and that
students (and others) were entitled to protection from foreseeably dangerous
individuals. For example, the university had more involvement in facilitating an
off-campus party in a case where there was no duty (Bradshaw) than the
university had with respect to the canoe trip in Mintz where there was a duty.77
70. Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
71. Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyen Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
72. Baldwin v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1981).
73. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
74. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138, 139-40; Baldwin, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 818-23;
Rabel, 514 N.E.2d at 560-61; Beach, 726 P.2d at 419.
75. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140-42; Baldwin, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 818-23; Rabel,
514 N.E.2d at 560-61; Beach, 726 P.2d at 419.
76. See supra Sections V.A, V.C.
77. In Mintz v. New York, 362 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (App. Div. 1975), the college
sponsored the outing club. In Bradshaw, a sophomore class picnic was facilitated by,
inter alia, funds made available to students with faculty advisor assistance, and by use
of campus duplicating faculties and campus locations to advertise for the party.
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These college alcohol cases, however, were simply following liquor no-
duty/injury rules of that era and applying them to campus liability issues. These
cases provided a limited and new form of insularity from legal liability for
colleges. While doctrinally narrow, the alcohol cases were far reaching in
impact. Liquor related injuries and problems were on the rise on college
campuses. Because many injuries involved alcohol use, colleges could look to
the courts for protection in a large number of situations. Whereas a typical
business only occasionally would deal with alcohol issues, major safety
problems on campus were consistently alcohol related.
The new limited insularity of the alcohol cases was very different from the
traditional forms of insularity once given to colleges. In the bystander period,
the legal protection of colleges would be in the form of no-duty rules, and not in
the form of charitable, governmental, or parental immunities, nor in the form of
rules of proximate causation or all-or-nothing affirmative defenses. University
liability or non-liability was now firmly entrenched in dimensions of duty/no-
duty. This was an almost entirely new phase for university law; university
student safety law was being mainstreamed.
VI. THE CURRENT CONSOLIDATION OF THE DUTY ERA: POTENTIAL
SHIFTS IN COLLEGE ALCOHOL RESPONSIBILITY
In the period from the mid-1980s to the present, courts have consolidated
and reinforced the duty era in higher education law. In all of the areas that
courts employed duty analysis in the previous era, recent court decisions have
followed and refined duty analysis. An important development has been that
courts have emphasized that duty does not always mean liability for a college:
students share responsibility for many of the risks that result in harm and they
also have a responsibility to use care for their own safety. The duty era is
forming into an era of balanced and shared rights and responsibilities of students
and colleges. In striking that balance, courts have clearly been influenced by
business-tort law, although they continue to try to strike a unique balance for
modem colleges. Significantly, the attitudes of courts toward college alcohol
related injury responsibility may be shifting: courts taken as a whole no longer
uniformly endorse no-duty rules in cases involving alcohol related injuries.
A. Premises Maintenance and Safety/Residence-Dormitory
Maintenance and Safety
Since the seminal cases of the 1970s and early 1980s, courts have
repeatedly acknowledged that universities have typical premises and
landlord/tenant maintenance and safety responsibilities.
Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 135, 137.
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For example, a college must use the same care as a private landowner with
respect to accumulation of snow and ice;78 students are invitees and are entitled
to reasonable care on premises;79 a university must warn students of excavation
dangers;8" athletic facilities must be maintained in reasonable condition;8 l a
college must install or keep dormitory/student residence doors and locks in
reasonable condition;82 and a university must repair and maintain sidewalks and
parking garages including fixing defects and filling in holes.83
Notably, when a university attempted to argue that routine premises
maintenance was protected as a discretionary function under modem rules of
governmental immunity, a court seriously rebuked that argument and refused to
reintroduce broad based governmental immunity into the law of higher
education.8
Students, like other plaintiffs, however, must attend to open and obvious
dangers.8 5 Simple failure to advert to obvious dangers or deliberately
encountering such dangers when other options are available can diminish and/or
defeat student recovery.86
B. Dangerous Persons
Courts have reacted very strongly to problems involving dangerous persons,
including other students, on campus and off. When injury occurs on campus,
there is a significant overlap with the premises/landlord cases in that
unreasonable premises/dormitory maintenance can facilitate criminal intrusions
78. Goldman v. State, 551 N.Y.S.2d 641, 642 (App. Div. 1990); Mead v. Nassau
Community College, 483 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (App. Div. 1985).
79. See Furek v. University of Del. 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991); Williams v.
Junior College Dist., 906 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Mo. Ct. App: 1995); Baldaufv. Kent State
Univ., 550 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
80. Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Thomas, 684 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App. 1984).
81. Henig v. Hofstra Univ., 553 N.Y.S. 479,480 (App. Div. 1990).
82. Bolkhir v. North Carolina State Univ., 365 S.E.2d 898, 902 (N.C. 1988);
Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. 1992).
83. Boyle v. Board of Supervisors, 672 So. 2d 254, 259 (La. Ct. App. 1996);
Malley v. Youngstown Univ., 658 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
84. Delaney, 835 S.W.2d at 60. In Delaney, the university essentially argued it did
not have a legal responsibility to fix broken locks on doorway even when those doors
became the point of entry for criminal intrusion. Id. at 57. The Texas Supreme Court
disagreed. Id. at 60.
85. See, e.g., Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 231 (I11. 1990).
86. See Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (La. 1996) (barring
recovery to student who sledded down hill into light pole); Weller v. College of the
SeNecas, 635 N.Y.S. 990, 993-94 (App. Div. 1995) (reducing recovery to student for
failure to use care); Banks v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 666 A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995) (barring recovery to student who climbed wall to bypass student gathering).
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and attacks.8 7 There is also a significant connection with alcohol, as many
dangerous persons are student drinkers (these issues are treated infra Section
VI.D).
With respect to dangerous persons on and off campus, three recent cases
stand out-Johnson v. Washington,"8 Nero v. Kansas State University,9 and
Gross v. Family Services Agency, Inc.90
In Johnson, a first year student was abducted and sexually assaulted on the
campus of Washington State University.91 The court determined that the student
was owed a duty of reasonable care as an invitee and tenant (the attack occurred
near her dormitory).92 The university was required to exercise reasonable-not
all possible-care once criminal danger in the area became foreseeable.93
Johnson also (re)affirmed two points: first, the attacker was not the sole
proximate cause as a matter of law,94 and second, the duty to protect against
foreseeable criminal attack was not subject to discretionary governmental
immunity. 9' The rule applied in Johnson is identical to that applied in
96commercial settings.
In Nero, a student was sexually attacked by another student in the basement
television room of her dormitory.97 The attacker had been placed in the
dormitory despite having been accused and charged with rape and sexual
assault98 and despite the fact that he had previously been removed from a
male/female residence and placed in an all male dormitory.99 There were no
warnings given and no special safety precautions taken."° The Nero court
determined that a college must use reasonable care once a dangerous student is
placed in residential housing.'01
Cases like Johnson and Nero are indications of strong judicial sentiments
that students are entitled to reasonable precautions regarding dangerous persons
on campus. Other cases have also sent this message since the 1980s.'0 2 Colleges
87. Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 56 (Tex. 1992).
88. 894 P.2d 1366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
89. 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993).
90. 716 So. 2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
91. Johnson, 894 P.2d at 1368.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1371.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1368-70.
96. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 43, at 125.




101. Id. at 780.
102. See Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464 (N.D.N.Y 1988); Jesik v.
Maricopa County Community College Dist., 611 P.2d 547 (Ariz. 1980); Peterson v. San
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face increasing responsibility regarding dangerous individuals off campus as
well. First, in the recent and notable Gross case, a Florida intermediate appellate
court ruled that a student participating in an off-campus internship is entitled to
reasonable care from the sponsoring university with regard to foreseeable
danger. 3 Second, Tarasoffin one form or another has developed into a majority
rule regarding potential off (and on) campus dangerous individuals. °4 And third,
following on the heels of Tarasoff colleges must now be careful in how they
package and ship students with known dangerous propensities to other programs
and to employers: °5 it is no longer safe to facilitate the transfer of a dangerous
student to another college (or to a job) as a way to avoid the problems with that
student.
With respect to dangerous persons, colleges are not strictly liable and other
parties can share responsibility for injuries that occur. First, in order to be liable,
danger must be both foreseeable and there must be a failure to use reasonable
care. Where danger is not reasonably foreseeable-including from the lack of
prior incidents of similar nature-colleges are not liable.'" Where reasonable
care is used, a university is not liable as well. 7 Second and obviously, an
attacker is legally responsible for damages caused. Third, in cases involving
alcohol (discussed infra Section VID), some courts suggest that students who
become victims of dangerous persons in alcohol related incidents may be subject
to liability-limiting victim fault defenses.
Francisco Community College, 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984); Cutler v. Board of Regents,
459 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. New York, 467 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y.
1984).
103. Gross v. Family Servs. Agency, Inc., 716 So. 2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998). In Gross, a twenty-three year old graduate student was attacked in the parking lot
of an off campus "praticum" location. Id. at 337. The student was required to do a
practicum and had selected this location from a list provided by her university. Id. The
court determined that she was entitled to proceed with her claim that she was assigned
to an unreasonably dangerous "practicum" location without adequate warning. Id. at
340.
104. Tarasoffv. Board of Regents, 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
105. See Randi v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997)
(holding actionable the failure to identify background history or dangerous behavior in
reference letter).
106. See L.W. v. Western Golf Ass'n, 675 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)
(dismissing action for lack of foreseeability where student attacker had never been a
previous threat-no complaints, and no one felt threatened); Hall v. Board of
Supervisors, 405 So. 2d 1125 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (finding no liability for unforeseeable
shooting).
107. See, e.g., Gragg v. Wichita State Univ., 934 P.2d 121 (Kan. 1997) (finding
no liability where woman was shot and killed while attending 4th of July fireworks
display on campus, where the university had deployed over 80 police officers for a
20,000 person event and had no knowledge of the assailant and had not had a shooting
or other violent death on campus for over 25 years).
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C. Student Activities-Duty and Student Responsibility
Colleges continue to owe duties to students in curricular and extracurricular
activities; however, students are required to take responsibility for their own
choices and the inherent risks of the activities they choose. Thus, recent court
decisions confirm that students accept the obvious, ordinary, and inherent risks
of a college sport or activity." 8 Students do not, however, accept the risk of non-
ordinary, non-obvious, or non-inherent risks, of deliberate or reckless violations
of safety rules or protocols, or that they will be taken to a level of activity and
risk that requires guidance, assistance, or information the students do not have."°
Thus, while universities continue to owe duties to students, students also
shoulder significant responsibility. Typically, in the face of ordinary, obvious,
and inherent risks, a student must take care to avoid injury.
D. The (Potentially) Changing Rules ofAlcohol Liability
No-duty alcohol rules remained powerfully entrenched in higher education
law well in to the early 1990s. Recently, however, there are signs that courts
will no longer categorically insulate universities from liability when alcohol use
contributes to an injury. There is now very clear precedent contradicting the
"bystander" cases and there are potential trends afoot which could further
undercut university alcohol injury legal insularity.
Consider first that in very recent times, some courts in non-college cases
have begun to pick away at the no-duty rules that have protected "social hosts"
and other non-bar/bartenders. Two types of authority are worth watching. In
one line of cases, some courts have imposed liability on businesses that furnish
alcohol to employees at work, at office parties, etc.' These cases raise
questions of "furnishing" alcohol and facilitating driving after a person is
intoxicated."' In another related development, some courts have taken an
expanded view of the notion of what it means to "furnish" alcohol, particularly
to minors."2
108. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Roettgen, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Ct. App.
1996); Sicard v. University of Dayton, 660 N.E.2d 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
109. See Roettgen, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 925; Sicard, 660 N.E.2d at 1241.
110. See Jon R. Erickson & Donna H. Hamilton, Liability of Commercial Vendors,
Employers and Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1013
(1983); David M. Holliday, Annotation, Intoxicating Liquors: Employer's Liability for
Furnishing or Permitting Liquor on Social Occasion, 51 A.L.R. 4th 1048 (1998).
111. See supra note 105.
112. See Rust v. Reyer, 670 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1998). In Rust, a person who did not
purchase or sell liquor facilitated a party where minors were furnished liquor. Id. at 823.
The court determined that one can furnish liquor to minors without selling liquor to them
or placing liquor in their hands directly. Id. at 824. The court made oblique reference
to colleges' alcohol use and the case will no doubt influence campus liquor policies in
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Second, social attitudes towards college-aged drinking (particularly abusive,
under-aged drinking) have shifted, particularly in the last two or three years. As
a result of the alcohol related death of a freshmen at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT), MIT has undergone criminal investigation for its role in
the incident." 3 Similar alcohol related deaths have made headlines around the
country," 4 and in the Spring of 1998, students at several colleges-including
Michigan State University-reacted violently over the denial of beer
privileges." 5 There is a sentiment that a dangerous college-aged drinking culture
has gotten out of hand and needs to be dealt with. In particular, there is concem
that some college freshman-first timers away from home especially-are
particularly vulnerable to such college liquor cultures. Such strong social
sentiment, coupled with trends in liquor liability law, suggest that more courts
will craft rules for colleges that establish legal duties in alcohol related injury
cases.
There is recent evidence that this shift is already occurring with some
courts. In Booker v. Lehigh University, " 6 a student who fell on a rocky trail after
consuming a large amount of alcohol sued Lehigh University and lost. For the
college, the case was a mixed victory; the court noted that had the university
purchased and supplied liquor, served liquor, or otherwise planned a liquor
event, the result would have been different." 7 The most notable case, however,
is clearly Furek v. University of Delaware."' In that case, a student was badly
burned when he had oven cleaner poured over his head in a pointless-and
prohibited-fraternity hazing incident." 19 As is usual in hazing incidents, alcohol
use facilitated the dangerous behavior. Unlike courts in the bystander era, the
Delaware Supreme Court did not view the University as a helpless bystander to
uncontrollable student drinking and hazing activities.'20 In particular, Furek
faulted the University for not adopting particular rules and protocols that would
have reasonably diminished the risks of alcohol and hazing injuries.' 21
New York State.
113. See John Ellement, MITFrat Accused ofManslaughter, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
18, 1998, atB1.
114. See Richard Chacon, Individual Issues Spark Campus Unrest, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 20, 1998, atB1.
115. See Christian Davenport & Rebeca Rodriguez, Southwestern, SWT Clamping
Down on Student Drinking, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Sept. 24, 1998, at Al;
Scripps Howard News Serv., Surveys and Headlines Agree: Results of Campus Drinking
Can Be Deadly, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 1997, at C11.
116. 800 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
117. Id. at 240.
118. 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
119. Id. at 509-10.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 522-23.
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Despite Furek, a number of courts in the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s
have followed the more traditional path of no-liability for alcohol injuries to
students. The cases have, inter alia, held that a minor was not entitled to sue
regarding injuries sustained as a result of off-campus drinking;'22 a university
was not liable for injuries sustained when an intoxicated student used a
trampoline at a fraternity party; 3 and a university was not liable when a student
who had been drinking at a fraternity party was killed in a motorcycle accident
on a public street. 4 Several cases have held that where students are drinking
and a student is suddenly and unforeseeably attacked (including sexual attacks)
by other students, the uniyersity is not liable.1 5 In perhaps the most unusual case
displaying antipathy to a student-drinker, a college freshman became intoxicated
off campus, was badly beaten in some unknown way, and made his way to a
commuter rail way platform where he collapsed and needed assistance. The
Illinois Supreme Court determined that the railroad personnel were under no
duty to provide immediate assistance to this drunken trespasser.2
6
The future of liability and duty regarding college-aged drinking remains to
be seen. It seems most likely that in the immediate future some courts will
disassociate from the trend of the "bystander" courts and will be influenced by
cases like Furek It also seems likely that other courts will continue to follow the
more traditional no-duty approach. In short, universities may face a genuine
split of authority on alcohol liability in the near future. One thing is certain
however: the crux of the issues presented will be oriented to duty/no-duty
questions.
VII. DUTY-APPLICATIONS OF GENERAL RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND
POLICIES TO THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT
The history of university safety/liability law has consistently been
dominated by special adaptations of general background rules and principles to
the unique university environment(s). In the period of insularity, courts tailored
a number of general tort doctrines-especially immunities-to create a unique
form of legal protection for colleges. The great challenge in university law came
when virtually all of the underlying doctrines made quantum shifts. Courts were
forced to redefine the legal parameters of university culture vis-a-vis student
safety. Courts went about this interstitially-not programmatically or
systematically-although in retrospect some rather clear patterns have emerged.
122. Hartman v. Bethany College, 778 F. Supp. 286 (N.D.W. Va. 1991).
123. University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987).
124. Millard v. Thiel College, 611 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
125. Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Ct. App. 1991);
L.W. v. Western Golf Ass'n, 675 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Motz v. Johnson,
651 N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
126. Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. 1996).
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University law today has been substantially mainstreamed, particularly in line
with business law paradigms. As a result, duty/no-duty rules have become
prominent and are now the compass point from which college liability is judged.
The mainstreaming of college law has created a major issue. There is a
legitimate concern that judges applying mainstream tort law-particularly
business law-may miss the unique qualities of university life. Mainstreaming
requires some attention to the special role of higher education in America, and
to the diverse environments in which such education is delivered.
Modem American courts considering general duty issues have come to
agree upon a basic premise:
Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is entitled to protection .... Accordingly, there is no more
magic inherent in the conclusory term "duty" [than there is in the
phrase "special relationship"]. Both are part and parcel of the same
inquiry into whether and how the law should regulate the activities and
dealings that people have with each other. As society changes, as our
sciences develop and our activities become more interdependent, so
our relations to one another change, and the law must adjust
accordingly .... [R]elations perhaps regarded as tenuous in a bygone
era may now be of such importance in our modem complicated society
as to require assurances that risks associated therewith be contained.'27
As a result of pioneering works by Prosser, Green, and others, American
courts-including ones deciding university tort law issues-agree that analysis
of duty and special relationships turns on considerations of policy. 28 Many
university cases have formed a powerful agreement on the relevant policies that
should be considered in the analyses of duty/no-duty questions.'29 The list of
127. Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311,
1322 (Ohio 1997). University law cases follow this relatively basic idea as well. See,
e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979); Furek v. University of
Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419
(Utah 1986).
128. See Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty In Negligence Law: The Recent
Consolidation of A Consensus On the Expansion of the Analyses of Duty and The New
Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1503 (1997).
129. The policies courts consider generally draw their roots one way or another to
the seminal Tarasoffcase. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,
343 (Cal. 1976); see also Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138-142; University of Denver v.
Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 59 (Colo. 1987); Furek, 594 A.2d at 506; Beach, 726 P.2d at 419.
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factors courts consider are very similar: ° essentially,"' courts balance, weigh,
and evaluate:
(1) foreseeability;
(2) nature/type of risk/harm;
(3) closeness;
(4) moral blame and responsibility;
(5) preventing future harm;
(6) burden on university and the larger community; and
(7) insurance.
These factors are similar to factors many courts use in other non-university
contexts.'32 These factors can be used to adapt duty rules to the particular
contexts of higher education. These factors work well in business contexts and
can also work well for universities.
Courts will consider foreseeability to be the prominent, but not the only,
factor. Forseeability works both ways. Colleges should prevent foreseeable
risks, ceteris paribus; however, colleges cannot reasonably prevent
unforeseeable risks and students are sometimes in the best position to foresee
and avoid risks. For example, in instances where alcohol triggers a violent
attack, a university cannot foresee every spontaneous outburst of anger and
violence; but a student may be in the best position to foresee and avoid the
risk.'33 Where students and colleges have equal knowledge of foreseeable
danger-e.g., the ordinary risks of intramural athletics-it will be fair and
appropriate to weigh other factors to determine responsibility (such as the fact
that imposing liability would burden the university with lawsuits over known
and assumed risks and could curtail opportunities for intramural athletics).
Courts will be particularly sensitive to the nature of the risks and the type
of harms presented. For example, courts have shown great concern over
predatory sexual attacks on young college women and have crafted rules
accordingly.'34 On the other hand, alcohol risks have troubled courts and have
often received different, less liability generating treatment.
The third factor, closeness, can be particularly useful. Courts can analogize
students to workers in the following way: Did the injury to the student occur
within the scope of the student/university relationship? Did the injury occur in
a manner, a time, and a place where reasonable persons would believe that the
student/university relationship was sufficiently close to warrant imposing
130. See supra notes 128-29.
131. See supra note 129. I have slightly adapted the factors various courts use.
132. See Lake, supra note 128, at 1517-19.
133. See, e.g., Motz v. Johnson, 651 N.E.2d 11"63, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
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liability? Thus, when a student is attacked in a dormitory, there is such a close
relationship, yet when students are off-campus drinking, driving, and on spring
break, for example, the connection wanes. 35 Modem university cases are highly
motivated by issues raised by this factor. Much of the discussion in the case law
of whether a student/college relationship is "special" can be resolved under this
factor.
The fourth factor-moral blame and responsibility-is a particularly
important and dispositive factor for colleges. Students must be given the
opportunity to take responsibility for themselves, their activities, and even each
other. College life can facilitate moral development, but not if it assumes all (or
none of) the responsibility for safety on campus. In this way, a college campus
is very different from a shopping mall or supermarket. We usually do not ask
consumers to construct a "shopping community"; we ask them to take only some
responsibility for their collective safety on business premises. College does not
and cannot function like a typical consumer premises. To be safe from attackers,
students cannot view on-campus security passively or atomistically: students
must not allow unknown visitors past checkpoints in violation of dormitory
safety rules and must not pry open locked security doors in similar violation of
rules. Students are active co-creators of the conditions under which collective
safety occurs on campus. Moreover, it is important that colleges facilitate the
learning of responsibility for self and others. While the college will take a lead
role in campus security and safety issues, "babysitting" would defeat the proper
role of most colleges in most instances. Most often the proper student/college
relationship is one of shared responsibility.
Rules of liability for campus safety should be particularly sensitive to
setting up proper incentives to prevent future harm. Some universities misread
the bystander era cases as suggesting that the best liability limiting approach
would be to distance college administration from student life, particularly
regarding alcohol danger. That type of incentive backfired, and has facilitated
greater risks, not more responsibility, in some instances. For example, first time
away from home college freshpersons are often ill-equipped to encounter
abusive alcohol cultures on campus. Rescue doctrine/bystander case law
counseled against "assuming duties" for such students. A laissez-faire strategy
towards such drinking-reinforced by the legal rules of bystander cases-has
contributed to particularly risky behavior patterns on some college campuses.
The students themselves, because of their levels of maturity, experience, and
judgment, are not always in the best position to correct an alcohol culture
without university guidance. On the other hand, some student injuries are either
unpreventable or students themselves (or others) are in the best position to
prevent them. Falling is an inherent risk of rock climbing; spontaneous acts of
unforeseeable violence will occur no matter what level of security is present.
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The sixth factor, burden, has most likely always motivated courts. Out of
concern for interfering with sovereign prerogatives of colleges, courts once gave
broad insularity to higher education. Today, most universities are not economic
colossi and safety costs can impact the quality of education and whether certain
students will be able to afford college education at all. There is a balance to be
struck. Too little safety and education suffers, but too many unnecessary
expenditures can drive the quality of education down. Some of the financial
burden can be distributed through insurance (see below), but not all can.
Compliance costs associated with prevention programs can be expensive and
uninsurable. Courts should be sensitive to sending messages that lead to
unreasonable increases in unnecessary expenditures. Courts also need to be
increasingly sensitive to the fact that some college environments create burdens
on off-campus interests and the greater community. No-duty alcohol rules must
be examined in light of the impact on the greater community. Do such rules tend
to foster unregulated, abusive, off-campus drinking with higher risks that citizens
will be injured or killed in automobile accidents? To what extent do students
with known problems put the community at risk? Lightening the responsibilities
of colleges can conceivably worsen the burden on the police, the community,
business, etc.
Finally, courts should be aware of the availability-or lack thereof-of
collateral sources. These factors relate heavily to the burden factor. Students in
college are often engaging in activities that prepare them for life in the
workforce, but they rarely have any system of loss compensation in place, such
as a workers compensation system. Devastating injuries in college may find
some compensation through health insurance, disability insurance, and other
limited collateral sources: students and families are unlikely to have sufficient
loss compensation insurance to cover, certain injuries, with potentially
catastrophic family consequences. Insurance markets have not evolved to
provide the kind of safety net that workers compensation schemes provide. In
and of itself, this should not necessarily counsel for or against liability, but
should be a factor of consideration in some cases.
136
Although the factors are basically similar to those that many courts use in
other contexts (particularly business law), the factors are adaptable to unique
higher education environments. It is likely that the factors will weight
differently for colleges than for similar commercial settings. An attack on
campus raises similar-but not identical-issues to an attack in a shopping mall,
for example. Courts have had two major points of agreement since the fall of
insularity: higher education law should be both mainstreamed and uniquely
tailored. The duty path courts are following allows for both, and this accounts
136. For example, a student badly injured on a work internship program may not
be able to recover for injuries when a full time work force employee could. Conversely,
since most family caused injuries are not compensated, student activities that are not as
clearly work-like perhaps should be treated similarly to family injuries, ceteris paribus.
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for much of its appeal as the new model in higher education safety law. The
duty era has brought mainstrearned uniqueness to college safety law.
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